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Introduction
At the end of 2007 Mexico joined the list of Latin Ameri-
can countries that, despite being formal and relatively sta-
ble democracies, have experienced epidemic levels of lethal 
violence that either match or surpass the number of deaths 
associated with civil war and traditional political conflict1.
Like Mexico is experiencing today, Colombia, Brazil, 
Venezuela and the countries of the northern triangle of Cen-
tral America (Honduras, Guatemala and El Salvador) have 
witnessed the emergence and consolidation of criminal net-
works that have profoundly weakened citizens’ security and 
the state’s capacity to uphold the rule of law.
The results have included expressions of violence neither 
rooted in traditional armed conflicts nor driven by objectives 
that could be qualified as political in any conventional way (Ad-
ams, 2014: 1; Davis, 2010: 399-400)2. Instead, they involve the 
participation of armed non-state actors, whose use of violence 
is generally motivated by the pursuit of profit, the need to ac-
1 The country’s homicide rate increased by more than 58% in 2008, 
and went from eight homicides per 100,000 inhabitants in 2007 to 
24 per 100,000 in 2011 (Shirk et al., 2014). In 2011 more than 
16,600 deaths were officially attributed to the actions of criminal 
organizations, a number that surpasses by far the 1,000 casualty 
threshold used to define a “civil war” (Schedler, 2014: 6-7).
2 A conventional definition of political violence includes only those 
acts whose aim is to uphold or subvert a given political system, 
ideology or movement (cf. Bourgois, 2001: 8).
116
Estudios Internacionales 181 (2015) • Universidad de Chile
quire territorial control over trafficking and distribution routes, 
or the simple imperative to neutralize competing organizations.
Like other countries across the region, Mexico attempted 
to contain and counteract the presence of criminal organi-
zations, particularly drug-trafficking organizations (DTOs), 
through a security strategy that privileged the use of repres-
sive and militarized measures. Announced at the end of 2006 
by Mexico’s former president, Felipe Calderón (in power 
2006-12), as an imminent all-out war against organized 
crime that the Mexican state had to undertake, this strategy 
also had several negative and unexpected consequences for 
the country’s insecurity. Among these were a steady increase 
in lethal and non-lethal forms of violence, including kidnap-
pings, extortion, extra-judicial killings and forced disap-
pearances; an escalation in human rights violations by mili-
tary and police personnel; and the fragmentation of DTOs, 
together with the emergence of smaller and more volatile 
criminal organizations (Guerrero, 2012). This has triggered 
the emergence of self-defense forces that, while claiming to 
defend the security of their communities, have pursued the 
strategy of taking justice into their own hands (Afura-Heim 
& Espach, 2013). Although Mexico’s current president, En-
rique Peña Nieto, has promised to revise the country’ securi-
ty strategy and move towards a more holistic approach that 
would prioritize protecting local communities, safeguard-
ing the rights of victims and reducing the impact of violent 
crimes, evidence as to the effects of these changes has been 
mixed (Felbab-Brown, 2014). Furthermore, the recent disap-
pearance and apparent mass killing of 43 students in Iguala, 
a city located in the Mexican state of Guerrero, has exposed 
the central role corruption and impunity play in explaining 
the country’s current levels of violence3.
As a result there is a pressing need to consider alternative 
3 On September 26th 2014, 43 student protesters went missing in the 
city of Iguala. According to recent investigations the students were 
kidnapped by a group of municipal police officers under the man-
date of the then-mayor of the city, José Luis Abarca, and his wife, 
María de los Ángeles Pineda. The police officers then turned the 
students over to the criminal organization Guerreros Unidos, which 
may have massacred them and burnt their bodies.
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ways to confront the challenges posed by non-conventional 
forms of armed violence in Mexico. This report will argue 
that acknowledging the plural, dynamic, and hybrid character 
of non-conventional violence is central to the design and im-
plementation of integral, sustainable, and effective responses. 
By the term “plural”, this report refers to the manifold actors 
and groups that characterize Mexico’s ever more fragmented 
and volatile insecurity context, and which call for the adop-
tion of differentiated and context-specific policies. The term 
“dynamic” illustrates the capacity of non-conventional armed 
actors, such as DTOs, gangs, and other criminal networks, to 
adapt and transform their activities, modes of organization, 
and geographical scope relatively quickly. The term “hybrid” 
points to the fact that non-conventional armed violence may 
involve the participation of both state actors (including public 
officials, and police and military personnel) and members of 
local communities. Recognizing the hybridity of non-conven-
tional violence illuminates the limits of those security policies 
designed in terms of an “us versus them” logic, in which state 
institutions and communities are regarded as incorruptible 
and impenetrable, while non-conventional armed actors are 
regarded as deviant elements or actors that lie on the margins 
of the country’s institutional and social fabric.
Three types of armed violence
Three main actors are behind Mexico’s current state of 
insecurity and violence: DTOs, street gangs and self-defense 
forces. While their interests and modes of organization dif-
fer, the connections between the illicit markets driving their 
activities and the political and social forces legitimizing their 
presence suggest that these actors operate as part of a con-
tinuum rather than in isolation.
For instance, evidence suggests that self-defense forces are 
at present partially funded by DTOs and are thus becom-
ing a threat to the very communities they claimed to protect 
(CCSPJP, 2013). For their part, street gangs have developed a 
closer relationship with DTOs and have become instrumen-
tal in ensuring the trans-shipment of drugs and their distri-
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bution in the U.S. market. Moreover, many DTOs have diver-
sified their activities, incorporating other violent crimes such 
as robbery, kidnapping, extortion and human trafficking. In 
so doing they have coerced, if not displaced, more autono-
mous and localized criminal cells that used to control these 
criminal markets. For the purposes of our discussion I will 
describe these actors separately in an effort to differentiate 
their relations with local communities and state authorities.
The first part of this report will examine the three above-
mentioned actors –DTOs, street gangs and self-defense 
forces– by looking at their aims, levels of organization, and 
connections with communities and state actors. The short-
comings of the past and present strategies that the Mexican 
government has adopted towards them and potential ways 
these might be remedied will also be highlighted. A second 
and final section will present five core elements that an al-
ternative approach to non-conventional armed violence in 
Mexico should incorporate.
Drug-trafficking organizations
DTOs have played a prominent role in Mexico’s recent es-
calation of violence, as well as in the emergence of more vis-
ible and spectacular forms of violence. According to recent 
estimations, organized-crime-style killings represent between 
30% and 50% of the total number of intentional homicides 
in Mexico (Shirk et al., 2014: 24). Although the presence of 
DTOs in Mexico can be traced back to the beginning of the 
20th century (Astorga, 2005), the role of DTOs as one of 
the country’s main drivers of violence is a more recent devel-
opment. As argued by Snyder and Durán-Martínez (2009), 
illicit markets do not necessarily generate greater levels of 
violence, particularly when political elites are willing and 
able to offer state-sponsored protection deals to criminal 
organizations4. Until the 1990s and again at the beginning 
of the 2000s, Mexican DTOs benefitted precisely from such 
4 Snyder and Durán-Martínez (2009: 254) define a state-sponsored 
protection racket as “informal institutions through which public 
officials refrain from enforcing the law or, alternatively, enforce it 
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protection rackets, thus privileging the use of bribery over 
violence in their transactions.
However, the relationship between DTOs and political 
elites fundamentally changed as a result of both, the coun-
try’s process of democratization and the regional consolida-
tion of Mexican DTOs, which emerged as the main suppliers 
of drugs to the U.S. market (Astorga & Shirk, 2010: 33). 
As a result DTOs increasingly turned to violence as a pre-
ferred means of securing dominance over their competitors. 
Moreover, as DTOs gained the upper hand in their relation-
ship with political elites, they began to use violence against 
public officials who did not comply or who did not deliver 
the expected protection.
The security policies promoted by former president Felipe 
Calderón against DTOs further intensified levels of violence. 
Anchored in a three-pronged strategy –the use of militarized 
operations, the imprisonment and elimination of DTOs’ 
main leaders or kingpins, and the seizure of drugs– Calde-
rón’s policies directly contributed to rising levels of violence 
both within and across these organizations. DTOs increased 
their arsenals of weaponry; directed attacks against public 
officials, journalists and civil society activists; and diversi-
fied their illicit activities by turning to kidnapping, extortion, 
human trafficking, and gas and oil theft (Magaloni et al., 
2011). Furthermore, the imprisonment and killing of several 
DTOs’ most influential kingpins led to the fragmentation 
and atomization of these organizations and to the subse-
quent emergence of smaller and more independent criminal 
cells (Felbab-Brown, 2014: 16). Moreover, the presence of 
these organizations became more widespread, as did the geo-
graphic distribution of intentional homicides (Shirk et al., 
2014: 26). Lastly, many DTOs started to promote the forced 
recruitment of members in order to make up for manpower 
losses. Mexican children and youth from marginalized ar-
eas, as well as Central American immigrants in transit to the 
U.S., have been particularly affected by this new develop-
ment (Meyer, 2010).
Although President Peña Nieto has tried to demarcate 
selectively against the rivals of a criminal organization, in exchange 
for a share of the profits generated by the organization”.
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his security strategy from that of the previous government, 
in practice his most important strategies resemble those of 
Calderón’s government. These include the arrest of influen-
tial drug lords, such as Joaquín “El Chapo” Guzmán, and 
the deployment of federal and military forces in towns that 
had fallen under DTO control. Moreover, although levels of 
lethal violence decreased by 12.5% in 2013, falling from 22 
to 19 homicides per 100,000 (INEGI, 2014), violent crimes 
such as extortion and kidnapping have actually increased 
since last year, while DTOs’ use of violence has continued to 
feature ever more brutal and spectacular forms of expression 
(ENVIPE-INEGI, 2014: 7).
Furthermore, corruption and impunity have remained 
at the heart of Mexico’s security crisis, as demonstrated by 
the various cases implicating state governors, mayors, police 
officers and military personnel in illicit activities. As such, 
DTOs’ actions have had a clear impact on the political sta-
bility of the country. Among other things, DTOs have con-
tributed to undermining the transparency and legitimacy of 
state institutions by controlling electoral processes, penetrat-
ing the security and justice systems at more than one level, 
and creating a climate of fear and insecurity that has helped 
weaken support for procedural justice and the rule of law 
(Schedler, 2014).
Although the use of violence by DTOs has become more 
widespread, there are still considerable differences between 
the types of tactics employed by these criminal organizations. 
For instance, two of the most influential DTOs in Mexico to-
day –the Sinaloa cartel and the Zetas– differ significantly in 
terms of their strategies and operations. The Sinaloa cartel 
favors corruption over violence, and is characterized by a 
relatively stable hierarchy and membership. It is known for 
its capacity to bribe high-level officials, including politicians 
and police personnel, as well as for using more “discreet” 
forms of violence, such as forced disappearances (Radden 
Keefe, 2012). In addition to developing strong ties with po-
litical and economic elites, the Sinaloa cartel often operates 
with the acquiescence of local communities who regard its 
leaders as social benefactors and patrons (Hernández, 2013: 
3-6). Furthermore, its main criminal activity continues to be 
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the production and trans-shipment of drugs.
In contrast, the Zetas are known for their conspicuous 
and highly publicized methods of violence. Created by former 
members of the Mexican army special forces, the Zetas oper-
ate as a loose network of criminal cells that have developed 
an extractive and highly diversified criminal model (Dudley, 
2012b). They have managed to exert control over more lo-
calized criminal organizations involved in human, sexual 
and drug trafficking, and operate in the Mexican states of 
Tamaulipas, Veracruz, and Chiapas, and along the borders 
and in the inner cities of Guatemala, Honduras and El Salva-
dor. Evidence shows that the absorption of independent and 
local criminal groups by regional DTOs –a process known as 
“cartelization”– might led to the weakening of local forms of 
social control exercised over these organizations and to the 
adoption of more predatory and violent behaviors (Mendoza 
Rockwell, 2012).
Understanding DTOs’ various modes of organization is 
central to thinking about more effective ways to reduce the 
harm and violence that these organizations generate. For in-
stance, whereas DTOs that privilege bribery might be per-
suaded more easily to stop using violence, those that regard 
violence as a fundamental means to retain their dominion 
can hardly be expected to change their tactics.
The Zetas exemplify the latter, the Sinaloa cartel the 
former. As a matter of fact, analysts have suggested that 
Mexico’s former president Calderón decided at the end of 
his presidency to direct most of the government’s militarized 
operations against those DTOs that, like the Zetas, were seen 
as responsible for producing the disturbing expressions of 
crime in the country (Felbab-Brown, 2013:7). However, this 
strategy –known as “focused deterrence”– generated mixed 
results at best. Although it facilitated the arrest of some of 
the Zetas’ main leaders, the organization’s highly dynamic, 
decentralized, and fluid nature enabled its ongoing reproduc-
tion through newer and increasingly fragmented cells.
For many observers, the Zetas’ modus operandi repre-
sents the future of Mexican DTOs: dynamic, predatory, frag-
mented and detached from the communities where they op-
erate. If this tendency is confirmed, a strategy of focused 
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deterrence might not be the most effective means to prevent 
the expansion of these organizations. In point of fact, it 
might accelerate their fragmentation and even trigger their 
territorial expansion, because organizations may splinter 
and seek to “transplant” their activities into different lo-
calities (Garay Salamanca & Salcedo-Albarán, 2012: 305). 
In addition, the strategy of focused deterrence, at least in 
the Mexican case, left untouched the challenge of state 
capture, with the consequence that networks of corruption 
linking DTOs and public officials persisted and deepened. 
The hybrid nature of non-conventional violence in Mexico 
demands anti-corruption efforts to be at the crux of any se-
curity strategy aimed at producing sustainable and positive 
results. These efforts need to start at the level of the police 
force, whose use of criminal violence has been identified 
as one of the main sources of citizens’ fear and insecurity 
(Magaloni et al., 2011). Furthermore, given that DTOs are 
increasingly using extortion and kidnapping against com-
mon citizens, any effective policy must move from its em-
phasis on attacking DTOs by militarized strategies to one 
of protecting vulnerable areas through the strategic deploy-
ment of local police forces, the strengthening of police in-
vestigation capacities and the development of effective re-
porting mechanisms.
Street gangs
Street gangs have undergone fundamental changes in 
Mexico over the past five to seven years. In 2006 a subre-
gional study comparing the presence and dynamics of gangs 
in Mexico, Central America, and the U.S. concluded that in 
Mexico gangs were considerably less violent, less organized 
and possessed weaker ties with organized crime when com-
pared to their counterparts in Guatemala, Honduras, and El 
Salvador (Barnes, 2006). 
Other comparative and national studies reached similar 
conclusions, characterising Mexican gangs as groups formed 
mostly by young men from marginalized areas, whose crimi-
nal activities were limited to minor robberies and selling 
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drugs at the local level (Perea, 2008; Santamaría, 2007). 
Their use of violence, these studies argued, remained at rela-
tively low levels due to the social bonds that kept gang mem-
bers connected to the communities where they operated.
Today, street gangs’ modus operandi has changed signifi-
cantly. While smaller and more localized gangs continue to 
exist in Mexico’s central and southern states, the country’s 
northern states have seen the emergence and consolidation 
of gangs characterized by greater levels of violence, deep-
er connections to organized crime and a more hierarchi-
cal structure with established transnational ties to the U.S. 
(Cawley, 2014). Salient among these gangs are Barrio Azteca, 
Mexicles and Mexican Mafia; many of the members of each 
of these originate from among Mexican nationals incarcer-
ated in the Texan and Californian prison systems.
With a strong presence in cities such as Monterrey, Ciu-
dad Juárez and Tijuana, these gangs gained a foothold on 
Mexican territory as a result of massive deportations carried 
out by the U.S. government during the 1990s and 2000s.
Evidence suggests that these gangs have created alliances 
with the Sinaloa cartel, the Juárez cartel, the Gulf cartel and 
the Zetas. They work as DTOs’ sicarios or hired assassins, as 
well as distributors or intermediaries for the trans-shipment 
of drugs to the U.S. market (Jones, 2013: 97). Their role has 
become more instrumental to these businesses as DTOs have 
transitioned into more fragmented organizations that depend 
on subcontractors or temporary alliances with other crimi-
nal groups. However, it should be noted here that, contrary 
to what some newspapers have suggested, none of these alli-
ances involves the Central American gangs known as maras. 
In fact, according to various studies, the viability of an alli-
ance between Mexican DTOs and maras is at best question-
able. Among other things, this is due to the more local char-
acter of maras’s criminal activities, which involve extortion, 
robbery and the local distribution of drugs (Dudley, 2012a; 
Santamaría, 2013). Nonetheless, Mexican DTOs have indeed 
built alliances with other Central American criminal organi-
zations, such as groups of transportistas, or transporters – 
i.e. groups that facilitate DTOs’ trans-shipment of drugs and 
offer access to local markets to distribute and sell drugs (Ga-
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ray Salamanca & Salcedo-Albarán, 2012: 305).
The transition of Mexico’s street gangs towards more 
hierarchical and violent organizations with established con-
nections with DTOs has clear consequences for the types of 
policies that can be implemented to prevent or control them. 
Given that they operate as transnational organizations and 
DTOs’ subcontractors with little or no attachment to local 
communities, these gangs lack the type of social or commu-
nity controls that more traditional gangs observed. Moreo-
ver, driven as they are by more predatory criminal interests, 
their use of violence cannot be prevented through the type of 
social interventions that have proved effective in the case of 
more localized juvenile gangs (Jones, 2013: 98-99).
Nevertheless, other policies could be implemented. For in-
stance, the 2012 truce between the two most powerful maras 
in El Salvador, which was mediated by the government and 
led to a significant decrease in homicides, might offer some 
important lessons for Mexico’s equally violent and well-or-
ganized gangs. If gang members from Barrio Azteca, Mex-
icles and Mexican Mafia continue to owe their allegiance 
mostly to their gang leadership, then it might be possible for 
the government to negotiate a halt to violence in exchange 
for improvements in the living conditions of gang members 
in Mexican prisons. However, as in El Salvador’s case, the ef-
fectiveness of this initiative would depend on the capacity of 
the gang leadership to implement the truce and discipline its 
members; this discipline might have been weakened by these 
gangs’ commitments to DTOs. Moreover, in order for such 
a truce to work in Mexico there should be sufficient checks 
and balances to ensure that the negotiations do not feed cor-
ruption or create further incentives for state capture.
A less controversial intervention would involve focusing 
on protecting children and youth in Mexico’s border and 
northern cities from being recruited by these gangs and by 
DTOs themselves. Evidence from programs working directly 
with at-risk youth in Mexico, but also in countries like Brazil, 
Guatemala, El Salvador and Nicaragua, demonstrate that ef-
fective interventions are based on an integral approach to ju-
venile violence (Muggah & Aguirre, 2013), i.e. an approach 
that is able to highlight the connections linking intra-family 
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violence, violence at school, and the dynamics of social and 
economic exclusion affecting this particular group.
Self-defense forces
Over the last five years self-defense forces have emerged 
in at least ten out of Mexico’s 32 states. Organized as a reac-
tion to increasing levels of violence and crime generated by 
DTOs in their communities, these groups, comprising mostly 
young and adult men, have decided to arm themselves and 
take matters into their own hands. Although DTOs’ presence 
in these communities is not new, the use of violence in com-
munities and against unarmed civilians, and DTOs’ incursion 
into criminal activities beyond the cultivation and smuggling 
of drugs are more recent trends. Guerrero and Michoacán, 
for instance, two of the Mexican states where self-defense 
forces have developed a stronger presence, have for decades 
been home to various DTOs. However, it was only when 
DTOs became more predatory, and started to diversify their 
activities by kidnapping and extorting small farmers and 
their families, that members of the community decided to 
organize groups of vigilantes or self-defense forces (Asfura-
Heim & Espach, 2013).
In principle, self-defense forces differ significantly from 
DTOs and street gangs inasmuch as their use of violence is 
driven by an interest in defending their communities rather 
than pursuing economic gain. However, the lack of transpar-
ency regarding these groups’ sources of funding and recent 
accusations about their potential collaboration with DTOs 
have raised fundamental questions about self-defense forces’ 
underlying motivations.5 Accusations of this kind abound, as 
do testimonies from members of these communities claiming 
that, as self-defense forces grow in numbers and weaponry, 
they are themselves becoming a threat to their communities. 
These allegations are not to be taken lightly. After all, self-de-
5 For instance, a self-defense group created in a small town in Mi-
choacán to counteract the presence of the Knights Templar was 
allegedly linked to the Jalisco cartel, a rival criminal organization 
(Cawley, 2013).
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fense forces have proven capable of fighting powerful DTOs 
and ousting some of these organizations’ criminal cells, dem-
onstrating an effective and well-organized use of force that 
in many ways surpasses the capacity of local police. Given 
that communities do not have the means –institutional or 
otherwise– to hold these groups accountable6, and given that 
many continue to operate in a grey zone between legality 
and illegality, it is plausible to think that these groups may 
at some point turn against locals. In this sense, as in the case 
of DTOs and street gangs, experience indicates that the more 
detached a non-conventional armed group is from the com-
munity where it operates the greater the chances are that it 
becomes threatening or adopts more predatory behavior.
Mexican authorities have attempted to control self-de-
fense forces by legalizing and integrating them into the state 
structure. Announced in May 2014, this initiative promoted 
the provision of arms and uniforms to some of these groups, 
as well as their assimilation into a new rural police force 
that would fight DTOs hand in hand with the armed forces. 
By institutionalizing their existence and promoting their col-
laboration with Mexican security forces, the government 
sought to stop the proliferation of these groups and prevent 
their further penetration by criminal interests. However, not 
all of these self-defense forces have been willing to collabo-
rate with the government. This stance follows from their dis-
trust of state authorities and a prevailing view that holds the 
government responsible for the country’s spiral of violence. 
Moreover, the institutionalization of self-defense forces has 
so far not translated into concrete mechanisms that would 
enable communities to gain control over these groups. In 
other words, it has increased their collaboration with police 
or military personnel, while it has not brought them closer 
to their communities. In addition, the government has not 
yet presented a plan for the eventual demobilization and 
disarmament of these groups, nor has it clarified what their 
functions will be once the objective of ousting DTOs’ crimi-
6 These groups’ lack of accountability contrasts with other experien-
ces of so-called vigilantes that have existed in indigenous commu-
nities in Mexico for many years, such as the ronda comunitaria of 
Cherán in Michoacán.
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nal cells has been achieved. A more desirable approach to 
self-defense forces would entail establishing a clear timeline 
to demobilize them, making them groups accountable to the 
communities they claim to protect, and taking concrete steps 
to create an increasingly professional and effective local po-
lice force to prevent the spread of vigilantism in the country.
Up until now self-defense forces have neither embraced 
a political ideology nor presented any political demands to 
the state beyond their demand for public safety. Their main 
goal continues to be –at least in principle– to protect their 
communities and expel so-called drug traffickers. However, 
the recent disappearance and probable mass killing of train-
ee teachers in Iguala, Guerrero, has served as a catalyst to 
mobilize various social and political forces that are willing 
to join self-defense forces or create new ones. Besides the 
teachers’ unions and the student movement, members of the 
guerrilla group Ejército Popular Revolucionario (EPR) have 
blamed the government for the students’ disappearance.
The EPR has called for the organization of “justice bri-
gades” and for the creation of armed units to fight the Mexi-
can “narco-state” (Olmos, 2014). This development could 
jeopardize the state’s current arrangement with self-defense 
forces. It could also radicalize these groups and distance 
them even further from their initial commitment to ensuring 
their communities’ public safety. Most importantly, it could 
contribute to the transformation of self-defense forces into a 
more conventional form of insurgency.
Addressing non-conventional violence in 
Mexico: an alternative framework
Mexico’s current levels of violence are underpinned by 
the presence of highly dynamic armed groups that have ex-
perienced a major process of expansion and fragmentation 
over the last decade. DTOs in particular have splintered into 
smaller criminal cells and are now subcontracting street 
gangs and coercing children, young people, and immigrants 
into their ranks. Although DTOs and street gangs are mostly 
driven by an interest in profiting from illicit and criminal ac-
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tivities, self-defense forces are being galvanized and becom-
ing politicized as citizens’ discontent over the state’s incapac-
ity to deliver security and justice continues to rise. Moreover, 
the hybrid character of these groups, which involves the 
direct participation or collaboration of public officials and 
security personnel, raises important questions regarding the 
political underpinnings of non-conventional armed violence. 
In particular, it calls into question the idea that non-conven-
tional armed groups are to be considered completely exter-
nal to Mexico’s institutional and political structures.
Non-conventional armed actors have become more de-
tached from the communities in which they operate. DTOs 
and street gangs, for instance, have transitioned to more fluid 
and fragmented organizations that operate through transna-
tional criminal networks. Self-defense forces continue to act 
on behalf of given communities, yet they seem increasingly 
inclined to collaborate with DTOs, in spite of their formal 
incorporation into rural police units. The distancing of non-
conventional armed actors from local communities weakens 
the latter’s capacity to hold these actors accountable, and 
enables the emergence of more violent forms of behavior 
within and against these communities.
Meanwhile, the war on drugs, with its emphasis on re-
pression and its focus on dismantling and destroying DTOs, 
has contributed to the fragmentation and geographical dif-
fusion of these criminal organizations. It has also added to 
the diversification of these organizations’ criminal activities 
and their adoption of ever more violent means to secure their 
profits. Furthermore, the war on drugs has done little to rem-
edy the institutional roots of drug-related violence, i.e. cor-
ruption and the criminal co-option of public officials.
Today, DTOs continue to be the main actors behind the 
high levels of violence in the country. Street gangs have, how-
ever, become more instrumental for DTOs and self-defense 
forces are experiencing rapid expansion. The potential or ac-
tual conflation of self-defense forces and DTOs, on the one 
hand, and the radicalization or politicization of self-defense 
forces, on the other, may lead to a deepening of Mexico’s 
insecurity crisis and initiate a new spiral of insurgent and 
criminal violence.
129
• O P I N I Ó N •
In light of this complex and volatile scenario, the following 
five policy recommendations seek to provide an alternative 
framework to non-conventional armed violence in Mexico.
(1) The state should recognize the hybrid character of 
non-conventional armed violence and prioritize the 
fight against corruption. 
The first step to tackle non-conventional armed violence 
in Mexico is to recognize that it is not limited to non-state 
actors. The influence attained by DTOs cannot be fully un-
derstood without taking into account the ongoing collabo-
ration and participation of public officials and security per-
sonnel in criminal activities, including extortion, kidnapping 
and extrajudicial killings. The war on drug’s original sin was 
to attempt to counteract DTOs as if they were purely exter-
nal to the state structure. They are not. Particularly at the 
municipal and state levels DTOs have managed to co-opt 
decision-making processes and infiltrate police and military 
personnel. The emergence of self-defense forces is itself a re-
sult of the deterioration of security institutions and of citi-
zens’ distrust in the state’s capacity and willingness to pro-
tect citizens. One of President Peña Nieto’s original promises 
was to launch a National Commission against Corruption. 
Almost two years have passed since he was inaugurated, but 
the initiative is still under revision by the Mexican Congress. 
It is critical to fast-track this initiative and adopt other con-
crete measures to fight corruption, both within the police 
and military forces, and in political and electoral processes 
throughout the country.
(2) The state should focus on the protection of 
affected communities, not on dismantling criminal 
organizations. 
In the last ten years Mexican governments have consist-
ently made the fight against DTOs the cornerstone of secu-
rity policy. The focus on repression and the elimination of 
DTOs’ kingpins has only contributed to their further prolif-
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eration and geographical diffusion. Given the failure of these 
past policies, and the plural and dynamic nature of these or-
ganizations, the focus should decisively shift from attacking 
DTOs to protecting local communities. President Peña Nieto 
has certainly included this shift as a central goal of his new 
security strategy, but so far no concrete initiative or program 
has been developed to achieve this.
The protection of local communities needs to go beyond 
the intermittent presence of the military in areas considered 
to be under the control of DTOs. It must involve the imple-
mentation of sustainable and long-term projects, and should 
be focused on the recovery of public spaces, the restitution of 
citizens’ trust, and the creation of real economic opportuni-
ties for young people. This has to be done at the local level, 
and through the creation of strategic alliances with business 
owners, civil society organizations, schools, and community 
leaders.
(3) The state should work at the local level, followed 
by a strategy of geographic sequencing that starts with 
the most affected areas and recognizes each area’s 
particular needs. 
Although Mexico’s geographic distribution of violence 
has become more widespread, it is still possible to iden-
tify those municipalities where levels of insecurity demand 
immediate attention. In order to be effective, the Mexican 
government needs to allocate its resources selectively and 
strategically by intervening first in those cities or munici-
palities that face higher levels of violence (Felbab-Brown, 
2013; Guerrero, 2012). In Mexico’s current context these 
localities are concentrated in the central and south-western 
states of Michoacán, Guerrero and Estado de México, and 
in the northern states of Chihuahua, Sinaloa, Baja California 
Norte and Tamaulipas. In Michoacán and Guerrero violence 
is driven mostly by DTOs, but also by self-defense forces, 
as well as by social unrest and insurgent groups such as the 
EPR, while in the northern states of Chihuahua and Baja 
California violence is driven by the collusion of DTOs and 
street gangs. Each of these localities demands different inter-
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ventions, depending on the set of armed actors that operate 
in each of them, but also on the strength of civil society or-
ganizations and the levels of state capture. In places where 
civil society organizations are stronger, the government can 
build local alliances and work with prevention or rehabilita-
tion programs already in place. If certain branches of the 
local government have been co-opted by DTOs, then the 
central government needs to oversee the functioning of local 
institutions and try to rebuild the legitimacy of and citizens’ 
trust in local institutions, while remaining in collaboration 
and dialogue with local communities.
(4) The state should prevent the forced recruitment of 
children, youth and immigrants by organized crime. 
Specific programs can be promoted to protect children 
and young men from being forcibly recruited by DTOs. Af-
terschool programs can be important, particularly in con-
texts where children are left alone for long periods.
Interventions should focus on prevention and rehabili-
tation, and should recognize the connections among intra-
family violence, juvenile violence and violence at school. In 
the case of immigrants, it is urgent to create a safety corridor 
that includes the formation of more shelters for immigrants 
and promotes collaboration among the Mexican authorities, 
civil society organizations, churches, and the consulates of 
Central American countries in Mexico. Mexican authorities 
should also facilitate the reporting of extortion and other 
crimes affecting immigrants, and guarantee the safety and 
human rights of immigrants.
(5) The state should promote a culture of legality in 
both state institutions and local communities. 
This report has insisted on the hybrid character of non-
conventional armed violence in Mexico. DTOs have operated 
in Mexican towns and communities for many decades. Before 
these organizations became violent and predatory, local com-
munities were in many ways complicit with the presence of 
DTOs, either by turning a blind eye to their illicit activities 
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or by receiving economic benefits from them. Local business-
es and local politicians in particular benefitted from DTOs, 
thereby blurring the lines between licit and illicit activities.
Those participating in self-defense forces have openly ad-
mitted that they did not perceive the presence of DTOs as a 
problem, at least until these organizations started to exercise 
violence against them. On the other hand, the networks of 
complicity and corruption between public officials and DTOs 
have been part of Mexico’s political landscape for many dec-
ades. In both cases so-called criminal actors were able to de-
velop their influence through the passive and active complicity 
of both local communities and state institutions. Promoting a 
culture of legality is certainly not an easy task, and can only be 
realized through long-term programs that re-establish citizens’ 
trust in state institutions and raise awareness about the costs 
that illegality and criminality have in terms of citizens’ security 
and well-being. It is, nonetheless, a necessary task if citizens 
and policymakers are to address the social and political roots 
of non-conventional armed violence in Mexico.
Gema Santamaría
Profesora Visitante 
Center for U.S.-Mexican Studies 
Universidad de California
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